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Mr.

BAYH, from

the Committee on the

following
REPORT
together with

Judiciary,

submitted the

INDIVIDUAL VIEWS
[Pursunnt to S. Res. 57, 88th Cong., Ist sess., as extended]

Senate Resolution 57, agreed to March 14, 1963, authorized the
Committee on the Judiciary, or any duly authorized subcommittee
to examine, investigate, and make a complete study of any
thereof,
nndl all matters pertaining to constitutional amendments under sections
of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 as
134(a) and 136
and in accordance with its jurisdictions specified by rule XXV
amended,
of the Standing Rules of the Senate. Pursuant to section 3 of said
the Standing Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments
resolution,
of the Committee on the Judiciary reports its actions and findings
and recommendations as follows:

SUMMARY
During the 1st session of the 88th Congress, 29 joint resolutions
proposing constitutional amendments were introduced in the Senate.
Appended to this report is a tabulation of these proposals by number,
sponsor, and subject matter, showing the action taken on each of them.
During the month of June 1963, the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendmensts held hearings on 10 resolutions to amend the
Constitution. These hearings related to various aspects of the
nomination and election of President and Vice President and presidential inability. Seven of the resolutions concern the nomination
and election of President and Vice President. This hearing was held
on June 4, 1963, which was supplemental to hearings held on May 23,
30; June 8, 27, 28, 29, and July 13, 1961-87th Congress, 1st session.
1
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Three of the resolutions concern presidential inability. Hearings
were held on these resolutions on June 11 and 18, 1963. Both sets of
have been printed.
hearings two
volumes of hearings have been printed, with a cumulative
Thus,
total of 261 printed pages. Numerous witnesses as Senators, Representatives, governmental officers, professors of political science, and
constitutional attorneys were heard. In addition, the record contains
the views of nationally known experts throughout the country.
Five resolutions have been reported by tile subcommittee to the
full committee. Two of them (S.J. Res. 12 and S.J. Res. 27) were
without recommendation. The remainder of these resolureported
tions (S.J. Res. 35, S.J. Res. 36, and S.J. Res. 37) were reported
The remaining resolutions were
favorably with written reports.
when
the
the
1st session of the 88th Congress
pending in subcommittee
ended.
A discussion of the principal areas of the subcommittee's activities,
divided according to subject matter, follows:
PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY
Senate Joint Resolution 35, introduced by Messrs. Kefauver and
Keating, and later sponsored by Mr. Dodd, was referred by the committee to the subcommittee on February 18, 1963. After the public
hearing of June 11, 1963 (which encompassed the subject matter of
S.J. Res. 28 a related resolution), the resolution with amendments
was reported favorably to tlhe full committee on June 25, 1963.
The purpose of Senate Joint Resolution 35, as reported by the
sulbcommnittee, is to authorize clearly the Vice President to exercise
the powers and duties of tle office of President at such times as the
President is unable to perform such powers and duties, and to give
the Congres3 tlle authority to enact legislation prescribing tle method
which the commencement and the termination of any inability
by
shall be determined.
ST''AT'EME N'T

TIthe, in ability clause, a(nd its ite'rpretation
The' Consttitution of tlle United Stxtes, in article [I, section 1,
clause 6, contains l)l'ovisiols rI elating, to the continuity of Ilie executive
power Iat times of ldeatl, resignation, ilnalility, or reinoval of a President. 'This clause relads asl follows:
In Case of tle Removal of the President from Office, or
of his l)eath, Resignation, or Inablility to disc1lar:ge the
Powers and l)uties of the said Office, the Slame s11all devolve
on the Vice President, and the Congress ma y y law
provide for theof Case of Remloval, I)eath, Resignation or
Ininbility, 1)othl the President an(l Vice President, declaring
what (Oficer slall nct accordingly, until the Disability be
removed, or a Iresidlent, sliall be elected.
Tlls is tlle laIlnguage of the Constitution as it was adopted by the
Constitutional l Conllenltion upon recominlendaltionl of tilc Committee
on1 Style. When this portion of the Constttiution was submitted to
thilit (olIllnittee it read ass follows:
In case of his (the President's) removal as aforesaid,
detitl, absence, resignation, or inability to discharge the
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powers or duties of his office, the Vice President shall exercise
those powers and duties until another President be chosen,
or until the inability of the President be removed.

3

'The Legislature may declare by law what officer of the
United States shall act as President, in case of the death,
resignation, or disability of the Presidenta,and Vice President;
and such officer shall act accordingly, until such disability
be removed, or a President shall be elected.
While the Committee on Style was given no authority to change
the substance of prior determinations of the Convention, it is clear
that this portion of the draft which that committee ultimately submitted was a considerable alteration of the proposal which the Committee had received. The records of the Constitutional Convention
do not contain any explicit interpretation of the provisions as they
relate to inability. As a matter of fact, the records of the Convention
contain only one apparent reference to the aspects of this clause which
deal with the question of disability. It was Mr. John Dickinson, of
Delaware, who, on August 27, 1787, asked:
What is the extent of the term "disability" and who is to
be the judge of it? (Farrand, "Records of the Constitutional
Convention of 1787," vol. 2, p. 427).
The question is not answered so far as the records of the Convention
disclose.
It was not until 1841 that this clause of the Constitution was called
into question by the occurrence of one of the listed contingencies.
In that year President William Henry Harrison (lied, and Vice Presi(ldlt John Tyler faced tile determination as to whether, under this
provision of the Constritution, ho must serve as Acting Presi(dent or
whether he became the President of the United States. Vice President Tyler gave answer by' taking the oath as President of the United
States. Whilo this evoked some protest at the time, noticeably that
of Senator William Allen, of Ohio, the Vice President (Tyler) was later
recognized
by the Congress as President of the United States by )both
HouIses of Congress (Congressional Globe, 27th Cong., 1st sess., vol.
10, pp. 3-5, May 31 to June 1, 1841).
l'lls precedent of John Tyler has since l)een confirmed on 7 occasions when Vice Presidents lIave succeeded to tlh Presidency of the
United States by virtue of the death of the incumbent President.
Vice Presidents Fillnore, Johnson, Arthur, Theodore Roosevelt,
Coolidge,
Truman, and Johnson all became President initially in this
m
osion, and tthe acquiescence in,
in, or
Tlhe acts
these Vie
of tes
or con
conacts of
Vice Presidents,
firlnation of, their acts by Congress have rferved to establish a precedent that, in one of the contingencies under article IT, section 1, clause
(, that of death, the Vice President becomes President of the United
States.
iThe clause which provides for succession in case of death also applies
to succession in case of resignation, removal from office, or inability.
In all four contingencies, thle Corstitution states: "the same shall
devolve on the Vice President." Thus it is said thhatwatever devolves
the Vice President upon death of the President, likewise devolves
upon him
by reason of the resignation, inability, or removal from office
uponthe President
of
(Theodore Dwight, "Presidential Inability, North
American Review, ' vol. 133, p. 442 (1881)).
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The Tyler precedent, therefore has served to cause doubt on the
of an incapacitated President to resume the functions of his
ability
office upon recovery. Professor Dwight, who later became president
of Yale University, found further basis for this argument in the fact
that the Constitution, while causing either the office, or the power and
duties of the office, to "devolve" upon the Vice President, is silent
on the return of the office or its functions to the President upon reWhere both the President and Vice President are incapable
covery.
of serving, the Constitution grants Congress the power to declare
what officer shall act as President "until the disability is removed."
These considerations apparently moved persons such as Daniel
Webster, who was Secretary of State when Tyler took office as President, to declare that the powers of the office are inseparable from the
office itself and that a recovered President could not displace a Vice
President who had assumed the prerogatives of the Presidency.
This interpretation gains support by implication from the language
of article I, section 3, clause 5, of the Constitution which provides
that the Senate shall choose a President

pro temporeIn the absence of the Vice President, or when he shall
exercise the office of President of the United States. [Italic
supplied.]
The doubt engendered by precedent was so strong that on two
occasions in the history of the United States it has contributed, mate-

to the failure of Vice Presidents to assume the office of President
rially
at a time when a President was disabled. The first of these occasions

arose in 1881 when President Garfield fell victim of an P.ssassin's
bullet. President Garfield lingered for some 80 days during which
ho performed but one official act, the signing of an extradition paper.
There is little doubt but that there were pressing issues before the
executive department at that time which required the attention of
a Chief Executive. Commissions were to be issued to officers of the
United States. The foreign relations of this Nation required attenwere vidences of mail frauds involving officials of the
tion. There w
Federal Government. 'Yet only such business as could bo disposed
of by the heads of Government departments, without Presidential
Vice President Arthur did, not act. Resupervision, was handled.
of
the
spected legal opinion
day was divided upon the ability of the
President to resume the duties of his office should he recover. (See
of Lyman Trumbull, Judge Thomas Cooley, Benjamin Butler,
opinions
and Prof. Theodore Dwight, "Presidential Inability, North American
vol. 133, pp. 417-446 (1881).)
Review,"
The division of legal authority on this question apparently extended
to the Cabinet, for newspapers of that day, notably the New York
the New York Tribune, and the New York Times contain
Herald,
accounts stating that the Cabinet considered the question of the adof the Vice President acting during the period of the Presivisability
dent's incapacity. Four of the seven Cabinet members were said to
be of the opinion that there could be no temporary devolution of
Presidential power on the Vice President. This group reportedly included the then Attorney General of the United States, Mr. Wayne
All of Garfield's Cabinet were of the view that it would
MacVeagh.
be desirable for the Vice President to act, but since they could not
agree upon the ability of the President to resume his office upon re-
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covery, and because the President's condition prevented them from
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS

the issue to him directly, the matter was dropped.
presenting
not
was
until President Woodrow Wilson suffered a severe stroke
It
in 1919 that the matter became of pressing urgency again. This
damage to President Wilson's health came at a time when the struggle
concerning the position of the United States in the League of Nations
was at its height. Major matters of foreign policy such as the Shantung Settlement were unresolved. The British Ambassador spent 4
months in Washington without being received by the President.
Twenty-eight acts of Congress became law without the President's
signature (Lindsay Rogers, "Presidential Inability, the Review,"
May
8, 1920; reprinted in 1958 hearings before Senate Subcommittee
on Constitutional Amendments, pp. 232-235). The President's wife
and a group of White House associates acted as a screening board on
decisions which could be submitted to the President without impairment of his health. (See Edith Bolling Wilson, "My Memoirs," pp.
288-290; Hoover, "Forty-Two Years in the White House," pp. 105106; Tumulty, "Woodrow Wilson as I Know Him," pp. 437-438.)
As in 1881, the Cabinet considered the advisability of asking the
Vice President to act as President. This time, there was considerable opposition to the adoption of such procedure on the part of assistants of the President. It has been reported by a presidential
secretary of that day that he reproached the Secretary of State for
such a possibility (Joseph P. T'umulty, "Woodrow Wilson
suggesting
as I Know Him," pp. 443-444). Upon the President's ultimate recovery the President caused the displacement of the Secretary of
State for reasons of alleged disloyalty to the President (Tumulty,
"Woodrow Wilson as I Know Him," pp. 444-445).
On three occasions during the Eisenhower administration, incidents
involving the physical health of the President served to focus attention on the inability clause. President Eisenhower became concerned
about the gap in the Constitution relative to presidential inability,
and he attempted to reduce the hazards by means of an informal
with Vice President Nixon. The agreement provided:
agreement
1, In the event of inability the President would-if possible-so inform the Vice President, and the Vice President would serve
as Acting President, exorcisinlg the powers and duties of the
office until the inability had ended.
2. In the event of an inability which would prevent the President from so communicating with' the Vice President, the Vice
President, after such consultation as seems to him appropriate
under the circumstances, would decide upon the cdevolution of
tle powers and duties of the office and would serve as Acting
President
until the inability had ended.
3. The President, in either event, would determine when the
had ended .and at that time would resume the full exinability
ercise of the powers and duties of the office.
President Kennedy entered into a similar agreement with Vice
President Johnson. Such informal agreements cannot be considered an
adequate solution to the problem because (a) their operation Woild
differ according to the relationship between the particular holders of
the offices; (b) an agreement cannot give the Vice President clear
authority to discharge powers conferred on the President by the
Constitution, treaties, or statutes; (c) no provision'is niade for'the
situation in which a dispute exists over whether or not the President
S. Rept. 1017,
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is disabled. Former Attorneys General Brownell and Rogers as well
as Attorney General Kennedy agree that the only definitive method
to settle the problem is by means of a constitutional amendment.
TIHE NEED FOR CHANGE

The historical review of the interpretation of article II, section 1,
clause 6, suggests the difficulties which it has already presented. The
of the clause is unclear, its application uncertain. The
language
clause couples the contingencies of a permanent nature such as death,
or removal from office, with inability, a contingency which
resignation,
be
may
temporary. It does not clearly commit the determination
of inability to any individual or group, nor does it define inability so
that the existence of such a status may be open and notorious. It
leaves uncertain the capacity in which the Vice President acts during
a period of inability of the President. It fails to limit the period
which the Vice President serves. It does not specify that a
during
recovered President may regain the prerogatives of his office if he has
relinquished then. It fails to provide any mechanism for determining
whether a President has in fact recovered from his inability, nor does
it indicate how a President, who sought to recover his prerogatives
while still disabled, might bo prevented from doing so. It also leaves
unclear the extent of the authority of Congress to act.
The resolution of these issues is imperative if continuity of executive
power is to be preserved with a minimum of turbulence at times when
a President is disabled. The importance of an executive power
of being exercised without appreciable interruption is greater
capablethan
ever before. 'lThe concern which was manifested on pretoday
vious occasions when a President was disabled, is increased when the
problem is weighed in the light of the increased importance of the
office of the Presidency of the United States and to the world.
The growth, not only in the power and prestige of the office of the
Presiloncy, but also in the demands which it makes upon the occupant
of tle office, imposes increased concern as to the health of the Presi(lent and the exercise of the powers and duties of his office when his
health will not permit him to continue their exercise, either tempoor permanently. This increased concern has in turn manifested
rarily
an intensified examination of the adequacy of the provisions relating
to the orderly transfer of the functions of the Presidency. Such an
examination is not reassuring. The constitutional provision has not
been utilized because its procedures have not been clear. After 175
of experience with the Constitution the inability clause remains
years
an untested provision of uncertain application.
METHOD OF CHANGE

In previous instances in history when this question has arisen, one
of tle major considerations has been whether Congress could constitutionally
proceed to resolve the problem by statute, or whether
an enabling constitutional amendment would be necessary. As early
as 1920, when the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Repre-

sentatives, 66th Congress, 2d session considered the problem, Representatives Madden, Rogers, and McArthur took the position that
the matter of disability could be dealt with by statute without an
amendment to the Constitution, whereas Representative Fess was
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was not authorized to act under the
opinionandthatthatCongress
an
amendment
would first have to be adopted
Constitution,
before
the
Committee
on
the
Judiciary, House of Repre(hearings
26
and
March
sentatives, February
1, 1920). Through the years,
this controversy has increased il intensity mnong Congressmen and
constitutional scholars who have considered the Presidential inability
problems.
Those who feel that Congress does not have the authority to resolve
the matter by statute claim that the Constitution does not support a
reasonable inference that Congress is empowered to legislate. They
out that article II, section 1, clause 6, of the Constitution aupoint
thorizes Congress to provide by statute for the case where both the
President and Vice President are incapable of serving. By implication, Congress does not have the authority to legislate with regard to
the situation which concerns only a disabled President, with the Vice
President succeeding to his powers and duties. Apparently this is
the proper construction, because the first statute dealing with Presidential succession under article II, section 1, clause 6, which was enacted by contemporaries of the framers of the Constitution, (id not
purport to establish succession in instances where the President alone
was disabled (act of March 1, 1792, 1 Stat. 239).
Serious doubts have also been raised as to whether tho "necessary
and proper" authority of article I, section 8, clause 18, gives the Congress the power to legislate in this situation. The Constitution does
not vest any department or office with the power to determine inability,
or to decide the term during which the Vice President sllall act, or to
leterrminre whether and at what time tlhe President may later regain
li lprerogatives upon recovery. Thus it is difficult to argue tliat
article I, section 8, clause 18, gives the Congress the authority to make
all laws which shall bo necessary and proper for carrying out such
b 0
pIowors.
In recent years, there seems to have been a strong shift of opinion in
favor of the proposition that a constitutional amendment is necessary,
and that a mere statute would not bo adequate to solve the problelil.
'The last three Attorneys General who have testified on the matter,
Herbert Brownell, William 1. Rogers, and Deputy Attorney General
Nicholas de. Katzonbach, have agreed an amendment is necessary.
In addition, the American Bar Association, the State bar associations of
Now York and Nebraska, and the Bar Association of the City of
Now York, have recently passed resolutions stating that a constitutional amendment is necessary to solve the problem.
The most persuasive argument in favor of first amending the
Constitution, before passing a Presidential inability statute, is that
so many legal questions have been raised about the authority of
Congress to act on this subject without an amendment that any
statute on the subject would be open to criticism and challenge at
the most critical time-that is, either when a President had become
or when a President sought to recover his office. Under
disabled,
these circumstances, there is an urgent need to adopt an enabling
amendment, so that Congress may proceed to resolve the problem
by enacting a statute that cannot be questioned on constitutional

of the

grounds.
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ANALYSIS

The proposal recommended by the subcommittee is cast in the form
of a constitutional amendment for the reasons which have been outlined earlier, the primary reason being to remove any doubt that
legislation
prescribing procedures
Congress has the authority to enactand
termination" of an inability.
to determine the "commencement
Article II, section 1, clause 6, of the Constitution is unclear on two
The first is whether the "office" of the President
points.
important
or the "powers and duties of the said office" devolve upon the Vice
President in the event of Presidential inability. The second is who
has the authority to determine what inability is, when it commences,
and when it terminates.
The first sentence would affirm the historical practice by which a
Vice President has become President upon the death of the President,
further extending the practice to the contingencies of resignation or
removal from office. It separates the provisions relating to inability
from those relating to death, resignation, or removal, thereby eliminatany ambiguity in the language of the present provision in article
ing section
II,
1, clause 6.
The second sentence makes it clear that it is not the "office" but the
"powers and duties of the office" which devolve on the Vice President,
in the time of Presidential inability. By establishing the title of
Acting President, the proposal further clarifies the status of the Vice
President during the period when he is discharging the powers and
duties of a disabled President. In addition, it is made clear that the
President may reassume the powers and (ldties of his office when his

liability has ended.
The third sentence clarifies the authority of Congress to legislate
on thle subject of Presidential succession, both in the case of removal,
death, or resignation, and also in aiPresidential inability situation.
'lThe sentence states that, if both the President and( Vice President
have been eliminated by removal, death, or resignation, then Congress
may declare 'what officer shall then be President." If neither the
President nor the Vice President is alle to function because of inability,
as presidentt * * T
Congress may declare what officer shall* "act
until a Plresident shall be elected, or * * until the inability shall
be remlovedl."
In the summer of 1963, after hearings on presidential; inability had
been concluded, it was the consensus of this subcommittee that Senate
Joint Resolution 35 offered perhaps the best solution to the constitutional gaps cited earlier. .
However, whenan assassin's bullet claimed the life of President
John ,Fitzgerald Kennedy on November 22, 1963, Members of tile

U.S. Senate and House of Representatives voiced renewed concern
over Presidential inability and vacancies in the Office of Vice President.
A variety of proposals to deal with these problems by amending the
Constitution were introduced and referred to this subcommittee.
Because of the renewed concern of Members, because of the apparent widespread public interest in these problems, and because of the
subcommnitteo's intense desire to find a reasonable solution that will
be accepted by the Congress and the several States, it was decided to
hold a new seroie of hearings during the 2d session of the 88th Congress.
The subcommittee decided not to concern itself with laws relating
to Presidential succession, Congress is given the constitutional power
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to determine the line of succession after the Vice President. The first
succession law of 1792 placed the President pro tempore of the Senate
first in line after the Vice President. The next succession law in 1886
placed the Secretary of State first in line after the Vice President.
Tile third and current succession law, passed in. 1947, placed the
Speaker of the House of Representatives first in line after the Vice
President. These adjustments in the lines of succession are made
from time to time as the Congress, in its wisdom, sees fit.
The subcommittee therefore decided to confine its hearings to the
vexing problems of athe inability of a President and the difficulties
whenever vacancy exists-as it has 17 times in our hispresentedthe
Office of Vice President.
tory-in
The subcommittee is helpful of finding a solution to these problems
that will provide reasonable machinery to obviate the problems of
and vacancies in the Vice Presidency without burdening the
inability
Constitution with procedural details. The subcommittee also will
strive for a solution that will leave to the Congress, as representatives
of the people, the ultimate determination in matters of inability and
filling vacancies in the Vice Presidency.
APPOINTMENT OF REPRESENTATIVES
Senate Joint Resolution 36 introduced by Messrs. Kefauver and
and later sponsored by Mr. Dodd, was referred by the full
Keating,
committee to the subcommittee on February 18, 1963. After the

public
hearing of June 11, 1963, tl3 resolution was reported favorably
to the full committee on June 26, 1963.
The purpose of Senate Joint Resolution 36 is to amend the Constitution to enable tihe Congress to function effectively in time of emeror disaster. It authorizes the executive authority of each State
gency
to make temporary appointments to fill vacancies in its representation
in the House of Representatives whenever such vacancies exceed onethird of the authorized membership of that body.
STATEMENT

When the Constitution was drafted, the ability to destroy people
on a mass basis by use of weapons of war could not be foreseen. T he
Fathers had no reason to assume that the membership of
Pounding
the House of Representatives might become so decimated
overnight
that it would be rendered incapable of exercising its constitutional
functions in a time of crisis. Intending that Members of the House
of Representatives should always
represent the will of the people, the

framers of the Constitution insisted that all vacancies in that body
be filled by special elections.
With the advent of nuclear bombs and other weapons of mass
vast areas can now be devastated almost instantaneously.
destruction,
We know that no system of defense is likely to be 100 percent
effective.
In any future war it is possible that the enemy will succeed in striking
some of our civilian
including the Nation's Capital.
These advances in thecommunities,
of destruction, coupled with the
technique
realities of the cold war, require reexamination of the ability of our
representative government to function in time of national disaster.
of the Executive authority is protected by the act of
Continuity
June
1948
25,
(ch. 644, sec. 1, 62 Stat., p. 672), regulating Presidential
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succession. As long as the House of Representatives is available to
choose a Speaker, Presidential succession can be maintained. The
could be reconstituted fairly readily by appointments by
judiciary
the Chief Executive. By virtue of the 17th amendment to the Constitution, vacancies in the Senate could be temporarily filled by appointments by the Governors of the respective States. But in the House
of Representatives, temporary appointments are not authorized.
Vacancies must be filled by special elections (U.S. Constitution, art. I,
sec. 2), which require a minimum delay of 60 days even in normal
times. In times of destruction and chaos caused by nuclear attack
upon our shores, it might well be considerably longer before elections
could properly be conducted in many congressional districts.
This inability to provide continuity of representation offers no great
times. wlut in periods of national emergency or
difficulty init ordinary
well paralyze the functioning of representative
disaster, could
As an Administrator of Civil Defense stated previously
government.
in support of this measure-_
It would be difficult to overestimate the importance of
to function in time of national emerCongressThe
continuing
functions
of the Congress become ever more
gency.
such circumstances. The ability of the
importanttounder
Congress act swiftly is essential to the successful defense
of the Nation.
if an atomic attack left the House
What would be the
of Representatives to consequences
function without a majority of its Members?
might suggest the absence of a quorum. Parliamentary
Any Member
precedents indicate that it would be ruled that a majority of the living
Members would constitute a quorum, but this still might not enable
the House to function. It is likely that any catastrophe which killed
a large number of Representatives would also incapacitate so many
that the House could not muster a majority of surviving Members.
It is ilmortant too that in such critical times the efficiency and representative character of the Congress be preserved. Vital legislation
would be needed quickly and any disfranchisement of substantial
portions of our Nation would be undesirable for many reasons. It
be suggested that the Chief Executive would stop into the
may
broach and act without legislative sanction in the national interest as
he perceived it at such a time. But this might not give the same
national unity as a. President supported by a fully constituted Congress and there need be no departure from constitutional representative government if precautionary steps are taken in advance of atomic
catastrophe. There is no reason why vacancies in the House, where
revenue measures must originate, should not be filled with the same
dispatch as those in the Senate. This amendment is a precautionary
step which is comparable to civil defense measures and stepped-up
military preparedness. It is not born of hysteria, but represents a
readiness to continue the orderly processes of government in all events.
Its speedy adoption will demonstrate to the enemies of freedom that
America is prepared governmentally as well as militarily, if they
choose to precipitate World War III.
The subject matter of this resolution has been before the Senate
since the 81st Congress when Senator William Knowland introduced
Senate Joint Resolution 145 along the same lines. In the 82d Congress, public hearings were held on Senate Joint Resolution 59. In

11
the 83d Congress, public hearings were held on Senate Joint Resolution
passed the Senate by a vote of 70 to 1 on June 4, 1954. In
39, which
the 84th Congress, public hearings were held on Senate Joint Resolution 8, and this resolution, as amended, passed the Senate by a vote of
76 to 3 on May 19, 1955. During the 85th Congress, Selate Joint
Resolution 157 was introduced, but no action was taken on it. In the
86th Congress, Senate Joint Resolution 39 passed the Senate 70 to 18
on February 2, 1960, although two additional articles were added to the
resolution on the floor of the Senate.
In the 87th Congress, Senators Kefauver and Keating introduced
Senate Joint Resolution 123, which was similar in substance to Senate
Joint Resolution 39, the resolution sponsored by Senator Knowland
which passed the Senate in the 83d Congress, and Senate Joint Resolution 85, which was introduced in the 86th Congress by Senator
Keating. Senate Joint Resolution 123 was approved in a report by
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS

the Attorney General, and the subcommittee recommended to the
Committee on the Judiciary that the joint resolution be reported
favorably to the Senate. The Judiciary Committee reported Senate
Joint Resolution 123 favorably to the Senate, but no further action
was taken with regard to it during the 87th Congress.
During the present Congress, Senators Kefauver and Keating
introduced Senate Joint Resolution 36, which is identical to Senate
Joint Resolution 123 of the 87th Congress. Hearings were deemed
unnecessary because of the clear and immediate need for action, the
extensive hearings and debate in previous Congresses, and the overwhelming support which the proposal has received in tile past. The
Subcommitt(,o on Constitutional Amendments considered the matter
on June 25, 1963, and unanimously recommended to tile Committee
on the Judiciary that it report Senate Joint Resolution 36 favorably
and without amendment.
ANALYSIS

Theo power to appoint Representatives arises only when the vacancies in the House exceed one-third of its authorized melmborshi.
The present membership of the House being 435, 146 vacancies would
have to exist before this extraordinary power could be invoked. The
number of vacancies could exist for several days, but as appointments
are made by the Governors pursuant to this amendment, the number
of vacancies naturally will diminish. On the date that the vacancies
total less than 146, the time limit on this power begins to run. From
that date, the Governors have 60 days within which to make the
or the authority lapses and the office must
temporary election. If within
be filled by appointments
the 60-day period, additional vacancies
arise from any cause, they also may be filled by gubernatorial appointment. After the number of vacancies drops below 146, if it arises
above that figure again, the power to appoint again comes into
existence.
Appointments made pursuant to the authority are temporary in
nature. Article I, section 2, of the Constitution, will still mandatorily
that a Governor issue writs of election when vacancies occur
require
in the representation of his State in the House of Representatives.
This amendment, by specific reference, emphasizes this requirement,
so that, depending upon conditions in the various States, the appointee's term should be limited to from 50 to 90 days.
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Although the amendment is designed for disaster-type situations,
the text of the resolution contains no reference to emergency or disaster. Such specification would raise such questions as the determination and proclamation of a disaster, whether only vacancies caused
filled by appointment, and the particular
by the disaster should bethe
vacancies resulting from
disaster. These problems are not presented because the power to appoint is brought into being by a factual
condition which will be readily ascertainable; namely, the existence
of 146 vacancies in the House of Representatives. Nevertheless, the
very existence of so many vacancies in the House of Representatives
a disaster and surely cannot occur short of some catapresupposes
The maintenance of a large number of vacancies
occurrence.
strophic
as a prerequisite to use of the appointive power assures that it will
only be used in the event of a disaster and prevents any possibility of
abuse.
Any catastrophe which produces the operative number of vacancies
will probably be accompanied by breakdowns in communications,
disorder, and confusion in both State and Federal Governments, and
vacancies in other public offices. Nevertheless, it is desirable that
some procedure be devised by which the executive authorities of the
various States will be notified that their appointive power has come
into being. Section 2 of the article authorizes Congress to enact
some such procedure. However, the constiestablishing
legislation
for
will never depend
the
tutional authority
appointments has
temporary
notification
whether
procedure been followed.
upon
any particular
It thus avoids the pitfalls of trying to provide constitutionally for all
the difficulties which might prevent a specified mode of notification
from being carried out.
Should unforeseen difficulties arise as a result of this grant of
the House of Representatives will continue to act as the
authority,
final arbiter by reason of its constitutional authority to be the judge
of the qualifications of its own Members (U.S. Constitution, art. 1,
sec. 5).
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

It is the fervent hope of the subcommittee that the authority
granted in this resolution need never be used. However, with our

the tremendous destructive power of thermonuclear
knowledgeit ofwould
be the height of folly to leave a constitutional gap
weapons,
of this nature in a representative government such as ours. When
whole cities may be obliterated in a split second, the Congress cannot
it have any inclination to do so, the realities of this
ignore, should
The time for action to erase a defect in our Constitution,
danger.could
not have been contemplated at the time of its adoption,
which
is at hand. Let us hope it is not overdue.
In view of the current international crisis, the subcommittee believed that approval of this resolution is more appropriate and more
needed than at any time in its previous legislative history. The
United States is making every effort and sparing no expense to demonstrate to our enemies that we are determined to resist them and
to defend freedom at all costs. While calling for personal sacrifice
and increased military preparation, the subcommittee was of the
opinion that we should not at the same time ignore this unnecessary
loophole in our Constitution. In the opinion of the subcommittee,
swift approval of this resolution by the Congress will demonstrate
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that America is preparing governmentally, as well as militarily, to
defend itself if our enemies choose to precipitate world war III.
As a constitutional amendment, this measure must secure the apof two-thirds of both Houses of Congress and the ratification
proval
the
legislatures of three-fourths of the several States. Since this
by
action may be somewhat time consuming, and time is of the essence
here, the subcommittee believes that this legislation should be approved promptly by the Senate.
RESIDENCE REQUIREMENTS FOR VOTING IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
Senate Joint Resolution 37, introduced by Messrs. Kefauver and
referred by the committee to the subcommittee on
Keating, was 1963.
On June 25, 1963, it was reported favorably by
18,
February
the subcommittee to the full committee.
PURPOSE

The purpose of the proposed amendment is to amend the Constitution to enable persons who have moved across State lines or from one
election district to another within States, to nevertheless vote in
presidential elections if they are otherwise qualified. It limits the
maximum residence requirement which a State may impose for voting
in presidential elections at 90 days. It also provides that a person
who does not meet a residence requirement may nevertheless vote in a
presidential election if such person is otherwise qualified to vote therein
and would also have been qualified to vote in the presidential election
at the place from which he moved, except for the fact of changing
residence.
STATEMENT

The problem of disfranchisement or our mobile population from
for the Nation's Clief Executive is a serious one. According
voting
to Census Bureau figures 19,800,000 American adults moved in 1961.
Of these, 13.2 million moved within their counties, 6.6 million moved
from county to county, and 3 million from State to State. This
of our population and its free movement from one State to
mobility
another is a desirable and necessary feature of 20th century America,
and all indications are that this is an increasing trend. However
State residence requirements for voting have not kept pace with this
fact of modern life in America. Three States require 2 years of residence before a person can vote for President. Thirty-five States
1 year and 12 call for 6 months. Appended is a table showing
require
the residence requirements of all the States. Furthermore, within
each State, persons may lose their right to vote in all elections merely
because they have changed their county or precinct of residence.
Three States require that the voter shall have resided in the county
of his residence for 1 year, and eight require 6 months' residence.
Precinct requirements vary widely, ranging from 30 days or a few
months to 1 year.
The victims of these outmoded residence requirements include
many of our citizens who are best equipped to exercise the right of
voting. They are educators, lawyers, clergymen, and executives of
interstate businesses. A General Electric Co. spokesman reported
that 6 percent of its executive personnel were disfranchised in the
S.

lept. 1017, 88-2--- 3
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1960 presidential election because they had been shifted from one
State to another in the company's organization. Interstate businesses
in manufacturing or distribution shift managers, salesmen,
engaged
and other executives constantly. Others who are penalized by outmoded residence requirements are those who act in the best American
tradition who have the initiative to pull up stakes and move to take
advantage of new opportunities. 12
In a survey of the 1952 election,
percent of the people who had
not voted said they were disfranchised by residence requirements.
Studies by V. O. Key estimated in 1958 that residence requirements
excluded more than 5 percent of the potential electorate
probably
from exercising the ballot. The American Heritage Foundation has
estimated that 8 million adult American citizens were barred from the
ballot box in the 1960 elections by inability to meet State, county, or
precinct residence requirements. It is significant that Idaho, the
State which had the highest voter-participation figure in the Nation
in 1960 (80.7 percent) is also a State of relatively moderate residence
requirements (6 months in State, 30 days in county).
It is frequently complained that too many eligible citizens who are
able to vote do not exercise their precious privilege at the ballot box.
It is shameful at the same time to continue a system of arbitrary
restrictions which preclude millions of our best citizens from participating in the choice of their President. Apart from the possible effects
of this upon election results, it is certain to produce apathy and bitterness in such people toward the Government which cheats them of their
democratic birthright because they have changed their residence.
The American people do not wish this evil to be continued. The
American -Heritage Foundation, which has a program to modernize
residence requirements for voting, reports widespread editorial and
popular support for relief of our mobile population's disfranchisement.
The need for action is clear.
It many be conceded that this problem would be best handled at the
local level if that solution were available as a reasonable alternative.
But this is not being effectively done. Organizations of State officials
have been conscious of this-problem and working toward solutions at
the State level for a number of years. The General Assembly of
States, an organization serviced by the Council of State Governments,
has been working for corrective action at the State level since 1952,
when it recommended that the organization concern itself with
absentee voting legislation which would prevent the loss of voting
for persons who moved from one State to another. The
rights
National Association of Secretaries of State in its 1953 convention
a proposed based upon Connecticut legislation which would
approvedformer
residents of a State to vote there for President and
permit
Vice President by absentee ballot until they become qualified under
the residence requirements of their new domicile. In 1955, the Coinmittee of State Officials on Suggested State Legislation approved as a
part of its program a draft act along the same lines.
Jn 1956, the 84th Congress urged the States to take corrective action by reciprocal agreements. House Concurrent Resolution 94,
sponsored
by Representative Curtis of'Massachusetts, passed the
House of Representatives, June 30, 1955, and the Senate agreed to the
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By its to
January 16,and1956.
terms, the Congress exitself
as
recommended
the Statesfavoring
pressed
the consideration of appropriate legislation to enable a person to vote for President and Vice President when such person would be eligible to vote but for the fact that he had
moved from one State to another and had not yet fulfilled
the residence requirements of such State to which he had
moved (70 Stat. 34).
However, despite 9 years of efforts by Congress and these organizations
of State officials, only a handful of States have taken corrective action.
are California, Connecticut, Missouri, Ohio, Vermont, and
They
Wisconsin. Legislation adopted in Connecticut in 1953 allows a
voter moving from the State to vote by absentee ballot for a 24
months' period after he has moved, provided he does not become a
qualified voter at his new residence. Vermont adopted a similar
measure in 1957. Wisconsin adopted a different approach in 1954
that a person who does not meet its residence requireby providing
ment shall nevertheless be entitled to vote in presidential elections
if he was either a qualified voter in another State immediately prior
to moving to Wisconsin, or would have been eligible in such other
State had he remained there until such election, and provided further
that he is otherwise qualified except for the residence requirement.
The new voter need only move to Wicsonsin in time to register at
least 10 days before election. (The Wisconsin law is the model for
sec. 2 of S.J. Res. 37.) In 1958, California and Missouri adopted
constitutional amendments relaxing requirements for new residents
to 54 days in California and 60 days in Missouri. In 1959, Ohio
similar legislation setting the residence period at 40 days.
adopted
In 1960, the Oregon constitution was amended by referendum to
authorize its legislature to permit otherwise qualified new residents
to vote in presidential elections.
While these States are to be commended for modernizing their
residence requirements, the smallness of their number is not-encouraging. However, the committee does not believe that the slowness of
corrective action by the States is due to any desire to perpetuate
artificial and. unfair residence restrictions to bar otherwise qualified
voters from the polls. The residence requirements of virtually all
States are contained in their State constitutions. Amendments to
State constitutions are generally slow, cumbersome, and expensive
procedures, and it is believed that this explains the inertia of a majority
of States. Legislation passed by the New Jersey Legislature in 1960,
similar to the Connecticut model, was vetoed by the Governor upon
advice that it violated the New Jersey State constitution. This
resulted in adoption of a resolution by the New Jersey Association of
of Election petitioning the Congress to adopt such
County Boards
as
would
be binding on each State and uniformly permit
legislation
voters who move across State lines to vote in presidential elections.
Residence qualifications for voting generally serve but two legitimate purposes: (1) to allow the voter to become acquainted with local
problems and candidates, and (2) to prevent election frauds and
double voting. The first should be irnnaterial in national presidential
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elections. The second purpose will not be handicapped by this
amendment.
There should be no fear that the short period will open new ways to
election frauds or double voting. A person has but one residence at a
time and the date of presidential elections is uniform throughout
given
the country. Residence is a fact to be determined in the administration of all election laws, regardless of the period for which it must have
existed. The great majority of States have county residence requirements applying to all elections which are as short as this 90-day
requirement for State residence and the latter can be enforced just as
well, and in the same manner, as county residence requirements.
The proposed amendment would immediately become a part of
the supreme law of each State. It would also provide a uniform system
The present pattern of varying and conflictthroughout the country.
the
States
to the problem, even if continued, could
ing approaches by
not produce the desired solution. For instance, a qualified voter now
moving from Connecticut to Wisconsin may vote in either State, by
absentee ballot in Connecticut or in Wisconsin by virtue of its special
residence requirement. But a voter moving from Wisconsin to Connecticut is disqualified under the laws of both States. Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution is thus tile simplest, fastest, and most effective
means of dealing with this problem.
During the 87th Congress, Senator Kefauver introduced Senate
Joint Resolution 14 and Senator Keating introduced Senate Joint
Resolution 90 on this subject. Senate Joint Resolution 14 would have
set at 1 year the maximum residence period for voting in presidential
elections and would also have required States to allow a person movtherefrom to vote by absentee ballot for a period of 2 years if the
ing
voter had not become qualified in another State, the latter provision
)eing modeled after the Connecticut statute mentioned above. Senate
Joint Resolution 90 simply set the maximum residence period at 90
These proposals were included in the hearings conducted by
days.
the Subconmmittee oil Constitutional Amendments on tlie Federal
Elections Systemiduring May, June, and July, 1961. 'The chairmen of
})oth the Republican
and Democratic National Committees supl)ortel
the objective of both resolutions, along with political scientists and
representatives of civic organizations. Tlhe executive director of the
AmericanIleritage Foundation suggested a combination of the two
proposals, a short-residence requirement with some additional provision securing the vote to those who move within its period.
On August 3, 1961, tile Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments considered Senate Joint Resolution 14 and Senate Joint Resolution 90 and agreed that some proposal along the lines just mentioned
should be reported favorably. This resulted in Senate Joint Resolution 128, which was introduced on August 28, 1961, by Senator
Senator Kefauver. It incorporated the 90-day period
Keating and Senator
by
Keating. Instead of the Connecticut approach,
proposed
which would have required the States to establish special absentee
balloting procedures for voters moving away, the new resolution
instead adopted the Wisconsin approach, mentioned above, which
enables the otherwise qualified citizen to vote in the State to which
lie moves. On September 1, 1961, the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amenldments recommended to theCommittee on the Judiciary
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that it report Senate Joint Resolution 128 favorably and without
amendment, but the Committee on the Judiciary did not do so during
the 87th Congress.
In the 88th Congress, Senators Kefauver and Keating introduced
Senate Joint Resolution 37, which is identical to Senate Joint Resolution 128 of the 87th Congress. Since extensive hearings were conducted on this subject during the 87th Congress, the Subcommittee
Dnl Constitutional Amendments was of the opinion that no further
hearings need be had, and it has recommended to the Committee on
the Judiciary that it report Senate Joint Resolution 37 favorably
and without amendment.
ANALYSIS

Section 1 of the proposed amendment would establish 90 days as
the maximum period of residence which may be imposed by any State
or the District of Columbia as a qualification for voting in presidential
elections. It applies to State, county, or precinct residence requirenments. However, it leaves the State free to require lesser periods of
residence.
Section 2 is designed to allow voting by persons who move into a
State prior to an election but still cannot meet its residence requiremIent. For instance, a 90-day period will not meet the needs of persons who move on September 1, a popular moving date, before a
November election. This section is patterned after Wisconsin's law
(sec. 9.045, West's, Wisconsin Statutes Annotated), which allows a
person to vote in Wisconsin who does not meet its residence requirement but is otherwise qualified and who has moved from a State where
he was qualified to vote or would have been so qualified had he remained there until election. (The latter provision protects the person who becomes of voting age after moving.) The effect of section
2 is to make the provisions of the Wisconsin law a part of the supreme
law of the land and thus a part of the laws of each State and the District of Columbia. However, it also applies to movements within a
to precinct, if tile only imState, fromtocounty to county, oris the
precinct
a
residence
I)pediment
person's voting
requirement of such a
subdivision. However, to take advantage of section 2, the voter must
l)e otherwise qualified, except for residence, under the laws of both
States. After 90 days of residence (or any lesser period which a State
may provide), he will be required to meet only the voting qualifications
of the State of his new residence.
This leaves the States free to enact such reasonable rules and
regulations as may be necessary to administer their voting laws,
including the residence qualification, and protect their elections from
fraud. The article applies only to "residents" in the established
meaning of the word, not to transients or persons temporarily in the
State. In Wisconsin, for instance, the new voter taking advantage
of the waiver of residence provision must submit a certified statement
from the municipal clerk of his former residence as to his qualifications
and must present an affidavit certifying his qualifications from two
freeholders in the Wisconsin precinct where he seeks to vote. Of
ballots in addition to the special procedures will be
course, special
this
but
is a hardship which has been voluntarily undertaken
required,
in at least six States and it is not believed that it will unduly burden
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election officials in other States. Registration laws would not be
affected and the States could still require the voters be registered
within a reasonable period in advance of an election so that proper
for possible fraud can be conducted. State penal
investigation
statutes for fraudulent voting practices will continue to be enforceable
and unlawfully cast ballots would be subject to challenge.
The committee wishes to emphasize that these provisions apply
to elections for presidential and vice-presidential electors. It
only
does not apply to local and State elections, elections of Congressmen
and Senators, or to presidential primaries. It is recognized that
with local problems and candidates over some period
acquaintance
be logical and desirable for these other elections, but the President
may
of the United States is the representative of all the people of the
United States and it is extremely unlikely that a person's change of
residence will, or should, have any effect upon their choice of President.
CONCLUSION

The time has come to correct the increasing problem of disfranchisement of mobile American citizens. It is a national shame that 8
million adult Americans are barred from the ballot box at presidential
elections merely because they have shifted their place of residence.
Senate Joint Resolution 37 offers a uniform, simple and effective
means of dealing with the problem. It is urged that the Congress
give it prompt approval in order that it may be submitted to the
States for ratification as soon as possible.

- -. .

Table: Residence requirements for voting in presidential elections
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Residence requirements for

voting in presidential elections
Requirements

State

Election district,

County

State

precinct, or
ward

3 months I..2 years ---------- 1 year .-----Alabama.-- ----------Alaska-------------------- 1 year ---------20days s ---------do-.
30days ------- 30 days....----Arizona.------6 months-.------do
..---------Arkansas.....------------------ do --.-------------- 3 months 4--54 days .------. do 8_--------California ------------ --.--do
16 days----do -..----Colorado
Connecticut------------- --.-do...----3
months.------30
Delaware .----.do....-----days.-------6 months ------Florida.....------------------do ....----Georgia.----------------- ----.do..--.------3 months..-----Iawaii...----------------- ---- do----------days.--------Idaho.------------------- 61 months -------. 30
3
----months
Illinois.-------------30
days ..------year.---------.
Indiana ------------------ 6 months.------ ----do-...-----Iowa ..-------------------- -_-edo...--------- 2 months 6--30 days....------Kansas..------------------- ---- do..-Kentucky .--------------- 1 year ----------- 6 months..------.- 2 months ------.
.-.- Louisiana .--------- ..-- -----do .--------- 1 year.---------- 3 monthsMaine -----------.------- 6 months........ 3 months 1 -----11 year .....
.----------.------------ 6 months.-----.. 6 months '..--..-Maryland
Massachusetts------------ ----do--...-6 months
Michigan.......-----30 days....-----.
Minnesota.-------------- ---- do.-----------0 day
1 year ......-----.
2 years ----Mlssissippi...------------2
2 months ..--...
months
Missouri .----------------.
Montana ..---------------6 months..------Nebraska -.----------i-da.y.........Nevada .-----.------.- do----6 months........
New Hampshire .-----.-.do .----------- 2 months .
.--.
New Jersey.
---.------- _,.-do..-------.--New Mexico.--------. 1 year. --------- 3 months 4----- 30 days ...-------.
New York.------------- .....do .....-...... 4 months ..----.. ...--do.............
..... do ...........
do North Carolina.---------- North Dakota....------------ do
"--------- 3 months 4-..do.-...-------40 days............
Ohio.----.........
--------.. .--.do l........... 40 days I.--Oklahoma....------------ ----- do ...------.-- 6 months ...----.- 30 days...........6 months .-------Oregon...----------------(I).
1 year 14 --------2 months .----.--Pennsylvania
---- do .-..-----.-Rhode Island-.--4 months.------1 year..----South Carolina.---------- 2 years I
South Dakota..------------ 1 year ----------. 3 months 4 --- 30 days....------T'ennessee.. -------------- --- do.....-------- -. do....----Texas .-------------months..---.-- 6 months..-----do -............
.do
..----------- 46 months.-------2 months __----4
Utah..._---.----- .do
.--.----..-Vermont.--.----------.- ....
-------- ' 30 days...------months-..
do ...------- Months.
.--. do
Virginia...-..----------- 36 months
..-do.....-----8..---. ..... do .............
Washington..-----West Virglnlias...-----.
10 days....----WLsconsln...-- ------------- ---- do '--.-----.--- 2 months 8..
---do ..------Wyoming -------------- .---.do.-----.--

Township,

municipality,
town, or city

-----

----------

-

30 days.
6 months.'

-------

--.--

.

.

.

.

--,---

----

2 months,'

30 days.
4 months.7
3 months.
-6 months.'
30 days.

.

----

6 months.
15 days."l

.

---.--

--..

.--...---

6 months.

3 months.
6 months.

-.

--.

I Otherwise qualified electors who have moved to a new precinct
vote in their old precincts.
' In

in the same county, town, or city may

election district.

New residents in the State may vote for President and Vice President only, after 64 days of residence.
' No elector who has changed his residence from one county, precinct, or town to another loses his right
to vote In his former county, precinct, or town until he acquires voting residence in the new one.
560 days,
3

90 days.

NMunlclp)allty.
I"Plantation."

' Ministers and wives may vote after 6 months' residence.
10 New residents in the State may vote for President and Vice President only, after 60 days of residence.
" In city of 4th class.
2
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residence requirement when voting for President and Vice President.
40-day
Voter must reside in precinct in which he registers.

'o6 months If previously an elector or native of the United States.

3 i'ublic school teachers and spouses may vote after 6 months' residence.
" 10-day precinct residence requirement when voting for President and Vice

President,
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THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE
The present system for election of President and Vice President is
embodied in article II, section 1, and the 12th amendment (1804) of
the Constitution. It provides that they shall be chosen by electors
appointed by each State in the manner directed by its legislature,
each State to have a number of electors equal to the total of its
Senators and Representatives. The 23d amendment now gives the
District of Columbia the number of electors to which it would be
entitled if it were a State, but in no event more than the least populous State. The electors for each State must meet separately in their
and ballot separately for the President and Vice
respective States
at least one of whom shall not be an inhabitant of their
President,
State. A majority vote of all electors is necessary for election to
each office. Absent a majority, the House of Representatives elects
the President from the three candidates receiving the largest number
of votes. In such an election, each State casts but a single vote, a
of the State congressional delegation thus controlling the
majority
vote of a State. A majority of votes is necessary to elect, and in the
absence of such a majority the Vice President acts as President. In
the absence of a majority of vice-presidential electoral votes, the
Senate elects the Vice President from the two highest candidates by a
simple
majority vote.
The foregoing is the entire constitutional foundation for the election of the most important political office in the world. In considerthe various pending proposals on the electoral college it is seen
ing
that each is a careful attempt to correct the inequities and dangers of
the present outmoded relic. It has been said of the present system:
Originally adopted as a compromise, the electoral college
resulted from a distrust of the people and conditions of
and communications which no longer exist.
geography
its
confusion
and uncertainties, by sheer luck it has
Despite
managed in most instances to elect a President who reasonably reflected the choice of a majority of the people. But this
good fortune has lulled us into inaction after each election
and the system has continued from ene election to the next.
4 years the electoral college is a loaded pistol pointed
Every
at our system of government. Its continued existence is a
roulette. Once its antiquated procedures
game ofa Russian
trigger loaded cylinder, it may be too late for the needed
corrections.
We cannot assume that U.S. Presidents for the space age
can continue to go into office in the oxcart furnished by the
electoral college.
This subject produced the greatest interest of all those included in
the subcommittee's hearings. There are many separate resolutions,
sponsored by numerous Senators, which would change in some way
the constitutional method of electing the President. These proposals
may be divided generally among the following basic plans:
1. Direct national election.
2. The proportional system.
3. rhe, district system.
4. Perfection of present system.
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election would effect the greatest change in the
(1) Direct national
The
electoral
college (meaning the individual electors)
system.
present
and the electoral votes of the States would be totally abolished.
Instead, the President would be elected directly by nationwide popular
vote. This plan requires a majority of the total popular vote for
election and provides for a runoff election among the top two candidates in the event none receives a majority in the first instance. Under
the plan a plurality of the total popular vote would be sufficient for
election.
In 1934, a proposal for direct national election was defeated 59 to 29
in the Senate. In 1950, when the Senate approved the proportional
amendment proposing direct national election was
system, a63floor
In 1956, when. the Senate again conTsidered the
to
.28.
defeated
defeated 66 to 17.
proportional system, a similar amendment was
are based on
resolutions
(2) Proportional system.-Some pending
the so-called Lodge-Gossett plan which would retain electoral votes
but divide each State's electoral votes among the candidates in proto their shares of its total popular vote. Presidential electors
portion
are abolished and the people in each State would vote directly for the
candidates for President.
The proportional allocation of each State's electoral votes is carried
of the total number of
to the nearest thousandth.

Forty percent

electoral votes is necessary for election, in the absence of which
election is by majority vote of a joint session of the House and Senate.
qualifications in each State are the same as those for electing
Voting
the most numerous branch of its legislature.
Some resolutions differ from Lodge-Gossett plan in that a plurality
of electoral votes is sufficient for election and the proportional division of each State's electoral votes is computed beyond one-thousandth if a more detailed calculation would change the result.
Other resolutions add to Lodge-Gossett a provision that the places
and manner of holding elections in each State shall be regulated by its
legislature. They also contain provisions for nomination by primary
elections.
The Lodge-Gossett plan passed the Senate in 1950 by a vote of
65 to 27. In the House a motion to suspend the rules for its consideration was defeated 210 to 134. This plan was favorably reported
again in 1955. Before it came to a
by theitsSenate Judiciary Conmmittee
vote, principal sponsors offered a compromise substitute by which
each State would choose between the proportional system or the district system. When the substitute amendment was agreed to by a
vote of only 48 to 37, the principal sponsors moved to recommit the
resolution to the Committee on the Judiciary.
(3) District system.-This plan retains the electoral college but
changes the method of choosing electors. Two electors from each
State are to be elected by plurality of the popular vote from the State
at large. All additional electors are to bte elected from single-elector
districts. Unlike recent proposals of the district system (Mundtthe districts will not necessarily correspond to congressional
Coudert),
districts. Separate presidential elector districts are to be established
a requirement that they be comby inthe States under
independently
as nearly as practicable,
and
contiguous
contain,
pact,
territory,
A
State.
within
each
majority of electoral votes
equal populations
continues to be necessary for election in the electoral college, in the
absence of which election is by a joint session of the House and Senate.
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Except for the 1955 Senate vote, which offered each State the choice
between the proportional and district plans, no constitutional amendment proposing a district system has been brought to a vote in either
House since 1826. Prior to that date, some form of district system
was considered in both Houses but never received the requisite twothirds vote of either.
(4) Perfection of present system.-This plan proposes to perfect
the present system as it is generally expected to function. It would
eliminate the individual presidential electors and allow the people
in each State to vote directly for President and Vice President.
The electoral votes of each State would be awarded automatically
to the candidate winning a plurality of its popular vote.
As is indicated by the number and variety of proposals, the hearings held by the subcommittee disclosed widespread dissatisfaction
with present constitutional methods but considerable disagreement
as to the aspects of the present system which should be changed
and the form which any change should take.
The unit rule system.--The first point of controversy is whether
to continue the present practice of awarding a State's entire electoral
vote to the candidate who receives the most popular votes. Most
supporters of this State-unit system concede that it operates to the
the most populous States. But they contend that this
advantage ofurban
voters a compensating power for other features of
only
gives
our present Federal-State political structure which favors rural
interests. The malapportionment of many State legislatures in
favor of rural voters and the composition of the House of Representatives are cited as operating to the disadvantage of urban interests.
Those who would change the State-unit rule are sharply divided
among the district, proportional, and direct election proposals.
This division is reflected in a poll conducted of the opinions of
A questionnaire was mailed to 766 heads of
political scientists.science
departments. Of the 254 who responded,
college political
46.9 percent favored the proportional system, 34.2 percent favored
direct national election, and 16.2 percent supported the district plan.
The witnesses at th e subcommittee's hearings in the 87th Congress
were also widely divided. Of the witnesses other than sponsors who
testified in person or submitted special statements, the district system
was supported by Prof. Bower Aly of the University of Oregon;
Prof. W. J. Evans of Mississippi State University; J. Harvie Williams,
secretary, American Good Government Society; Lucius Wilmerding,
the National Association of Manufacturers; and Chairman William E.
Miller of the Republican National Committee. Former President
Harry S. Truman sublnitted a statement proposing a district system
utilizing congressional districts.
Thle proportional system was supported by Ed Gossett, president,
American Good Government Society; Prof. Kenneth Kofmehl of
Purdue University; Prof. Paul J. Piccard of Florida State University;
Oregon Governor Mark O. Hatfield; and Fred G. Sherrill, of Los
Calif.
Angeles,
Direct national election was supported by Prof. Paul T. David of
the University of Virginia, Prof. Ralph G. Goldman of Michigan
State University, Prof. Avery Leiserson of Vanderbilt University,
and Prof. David B. Truman of Columbia University. (Professor
Piccard's first preference is direct national election. He supported
the proportional plan as a feasible compromise.)
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Retention or perfection of the present State-unit system was supby Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Deputy Attorney- General;
ported
Democratic National Chairman John M. Bailey; Dean Stephen K.
of Citizenship and Public
Bailey of the MTaxwell GraduateandSchool
Gus
director, Political
Tyler,
Affairs, Syracuse University;
Union. (Mr.
Workers'
Ladies'
Garment
International
Department,
is
direct
national
election.)
Tyler's preference
However, there is more common ground among proponents of the
district, proportional, and direct election plans than is generally
realized. Despite the fact that the district and proportional plans
would retain the States' electoral votes and direct election would
totally eliminate them, and despite some fundamental differences
between the district and proportional plans, there are several objectives which would be accomplished by the ,idopLion of any one of the
three plans.
Giving each State a minimum of three electoral votes regardless of
was originally intended to federalize presidential elections
population
and prevent the larger States from dictating the choice. Despite
this, the more populous urban States have come into dominance
because of the operation of the unit rule.
In a statement submitted for the subcommittee's hearings in the
87th Congress, former President Trunman says:
The electoral college was first devised to protect the small
States from dominance by the larger States, as for example,
Delaware and Rhode Island from being dominated by
Virginia and New York.
The problem we face today is that of the emergence of the
big cities into political overbalance, with the threat of imposing their choices on the rest of the country.
Former President Hoover sounded a similar note in writing to
Senator Iefauver concerning the subcommittee's hearings:
Your subject is important. It confronts the same difficulties as were met by the Founding Fathers-that is, to
prevent domination by a few large States.
'The large States are generally the so-called pivotal States which
1may go either way. Presidential candidates understandably emplhasize their campaigns in these States because of the large blocks of
electoral votes which may be won by the slightest margin in popular
votes. The district, proportional, and direct election plans all would
reduce the power of these States. All would split them as electoral
units and prevent a State's entire weight from being thrown to one
candidate. Whether expressed in popular votes or electoral votes,
each of the three plans would divide the elective strength of such
States between the principal candidates.
It is also charged that the present system unduly favors the "swing
votes" of minority groups in these pivotal States. They may hold
the balance of power and be able to tip the State's popular vote
and hence its entire electoral vote, to the candidate who
plurality,
best appeals to them. By splitting the unit votes of the pivotal
States, the district, proportional, and direct election plans would
each eliminate the basis of power of such bloc votes.
The disfranchisemenI in each State of voters who are in the minority
is another principal objection. Millions of popular votes are not
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reflected in the national electoral vote totals merely because
were exceeded in their States. Again, the proportional, district, they
and
direct national election systems would all meet this inequity to some
The proportional system and direct national election would
degree.
each insure that all minority votes in each State are counted in the
national total. The district system would accomplish a similar result
in the majority of States, particularly in the more heavily populated
ones, depending upon whether its use splits the State's electoral
vote-which is not to be expected imi all States.
The tendency of both parties to ignore so-called sure States where
one party has a clear majority would be affected by all three proposals.
The minority party's strength in a previously sure State would
always be reflected in the national totals under the proportional and
direct national election systems. Under the district system the
minority could capture electoral votes wherever it could win one or
more districts despite losing the State at large.
One other factor should be mentioned. The possibility of a minority
President (one who obtains a majority of the electoral votes even
though an opponent receives more popular votes) is a characteristic
of the present system which causes much concern. We have had
three such Presidents, in 1824, 1876, and 1888. (On 11 other occathe Presidentreceived less than a majority of the total popular
sions,but
vote
outpolled his nearest
opponent.) Although the district and
proportional
plans
may differ in their effect on this possibility, any
proposal which
preserves the electoral votes of the-States necessarily
the
perpetuates possibility of a minority President. In fact the constitutional purpose of the three-electoral-vote minimum is to insure
that mere numbers of votes cannot determine the Presidency. Only
direct national election will fully remedy this.
This points up the fact that the so-called popular vote is a fiction.
It will continue to be a fiction so long as the people do not vote nationally, but vote instead by State units, and so long as -they vote for
tickets of electors instead of for the candidates themselves. This is
illustrated by the 1960 election in Alabama, where most Democratic
voters cast their ballots for a ticket of five Kennedy electors and six
voted for Senator Byrd). It is
unpledged toelectors (who
eventually
the
vote
impossible
popular
apply
concept to this situation. It is
therefore impossible to compute popular vote totals for the candidates
in Alabama or the Nation in 1960.
The practical effects of the various proposals on these and other
characteristics of the present system are analyzed objectively and at
length in a recent study by the staff of the subcommittee.
Aside from the question of changing the unit rule system, there is
considerably
greater agreement in the proposed amendments. There
are two other aspects of the present constitutional system which most
proposals would correct and there is little disagreement as to the form
which the corrections should take. These are (1) the office of presidential elector and (2) the contingent election in the House of Representatives when no candidate has a majority of the electoral votes.
THE OFFICE OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTOR

Under present constitutional provisions, the elector is free to exercise
his independent judgment in voting, regardless of whether he is
instructed by State law or has given a pledge, or whether his own

CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS

25

name was even on the ballot. This power to frustrate thelpopular
will has seldom been used, but its continued existence is unnecessary
under any system.
In 1960, Henry D. Irwin, a Republican presidential elector in
Oklahoma, votedof for Senator Byrd in the electoral college. Mr. Irwin
was a member the regular Republican ticket and was expected to
vote for Vice President Nixon. On July 13, 1961, Mr. Irwin testified
at length at the subcommittee's hearings. He--revealed that his
action resulted from a movement of substantial proportions designed
to utilize the independence of electors in order to control the results
of the election. The subcommittee received evidence that a similar
movement had already been launched to subvert the 1964 election.
The 1960 election also saw in two States the appointment of unelectors for the first time since the early days of the Nation.
pledged
Votes were cast and recorded in the electoral college for persons who
were not even candidates. Not only is this permitted by present
constitutional provisions but it is actually a return to the operation
of the system as contemplated by the Founding Fathers. Voters place
the choice in such electors and do not know for whom they may be
If unpledged electors were to hold the balance
voting forinPresident.
of power a-close election, they could personally control the outcome
for either major candidate or they could throw the election
by voting
into the House of'Representatives by voting for a third person.
A third defect in the present constitutional status of electors is the
absolute power which each State legislature has over their appointment. The U.S. Supreme Court held long ago that present constitutional provisions give to each State legislature a. "plenary power"
over the appointment of presidential electors. Each legislature can
as was done frequently in early years.
appointeachthe electors itself,
can vary its State's elective method. from one
Also,
legislature
election to the next. In 1892, the Michigan Legislature adopted a
district system for that one election in order to split the State's electoral vote and thus salvaged five electoral votes for the candidate of
the party in control of the legislature. The subcommittee heard
that a similar course was considered in one State in 1960.
testimony
In another State legislature, there was a movement after the election
to suspend the State's election laws and appoint independent electors.
All pending proposals would eliminate the possibility of independent
or unpledged electors. All would impose uniform systems which
could not be varied from State to State or from one election to the
next. Proposals of the proportional system and those which retain
the State unit rule totally eliminate the elector as an intermediary
between the voter and the actual election. Electoral votes are retained but are awarded automatically according to the popular vote.
The district system provides that the people choose electors but an
amendment has been filed by its sponsors which requires that electors
pledge their votes in advance. Direct national election obviously
solves these problems also since it eliminates both electors and electoral
votes.

CONTINGENT ELECTIONS IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

When the electoral college fails to produce a majority for one
election in the House of
places oftheeach
candidate, the Constitution
State having one vote.
the
with
Representatives
delegation
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Two Presidents have been elected in this manner, in 1800 and 1824.
Each State's vote is determined by the majority of its delegation.
In the event a State delegation is evenly split, the State would lose
its vote. It is obviously unfair to give the 3-member delegation of
Nevada or Alaska the same voice as the 43-member delegation of
New York. The opportunity for a deadlock and third party balance
of power is also apparent. Most pending proposals would correct
this inequity by substituting election by a joint session of the House
and Senate with each Member having one vote. This would give each
State the same relative weight that it has in the electoral college.
On June 25, 1963, the subcommittee in executive session discussed
the seven proposals on the electoral college which were pending before
it. This consideration finally focused itself into a choice between
Senate Joint Resolution 12 and Senate Joint Resolution 27. The
proponents of each of these resolutions disagree with each other on
basic theory and their positions are not reconcilable. This division
of opinion on the electoral college reform plans traces itself all the way
back to the first plan and the early days of the Lodge-Gossett bills.
the subcommittee was unable to agree on either of
Consequently,
these resolutions. Neither one could command a majority vote.
The impasse was resolved by reporting both bills to the full committee
without recommendation with an explanation of the subcommittee's
action.
EQUAL RIGHTS OF WOMEN
On February 18, 1963, Senate Joint Resolution 45 was introduced
Senator McGee for himself and 33 other Senators. This proposal
by
is designed to secure equal rights for men and women and would forbid
denial or abridgement of equality of rights under the law on account
of sex. In the 87th Congress a similar bill, Senate Joint Resolution
142, was approved by the subcommittee, the full committee, and the
Senate (cf., S. Rept. 2192, 87th Cong., 2d sess.). Legislation along
these lines has been before the Congress since adoption of the 19th
amendment to the U.S. Constitution first prohibited denial of voting
on account of sex. The pending resolution would complete
rights
the movement for legal equality for women. Like the 14th and 19th
amendments, the prohibitions of the proposed amendment would be
directed against acts of the States and the United States. It would
not apply to acts of individuals. Proponents of the amendment
maintain that it is particularly designed to establish equality of treatment under laws touching upon employment.
STATEMENT

The United Nations Charter to which the United States is a
states in the preamble, as one of its objectives, the resignatory,
affirmatlon of faith in the equal rights of men and
women. As a
to
this
to its
the
United
States
has
subscribed
signatory
charter,
those
in
the
principles,
including
expressed
preamble. Supporters of
this amendment contend, however, that this Nation has not kept pace
with other nations, including Egypt, Burma, Greece, Japan, Western
Germany,to and
Pakistan, all of which have given constitutional
women.
equality
Opponents of the legislation caution against the amendment, noting
that the ramifications of a general statement to apply across the entire
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system of our jurisprudence are complex and perplexing. As to the
United Nations Charter, they point to chapter 1, article 2, section 7,

wherein it is stated:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize
the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state * * *.
Resolutions containing this proposal were reported by the Committee on the Judiciary in the 80th, 81st, 82d, 83d, 84th, 86th, and
87th Congresses. In the 81st and 83d Congresses, the equal rights
the Senate with an amendment, but was not acted
proposal passed
the
House of Representatives. In the 86th Congress,
upon by
Senator Hayden proposed and the Senate adopted the same floor
amendment which had been agreed to by the Senate hi previous
Congresses. The language of this amendment is as follows:
The provisions of this article shall not be construed to impair
any rights, benefits, or exemptions now or hereafter conferred by law upon persons of the female sex.
Past debates and hearings have shown disagreement among women's
organizations concerning the benefits which this amendment would
bring to their sex. The desirability of equality is almost unanimously
conceded. The method of carrying such into effect has created the
areas of disagreement.
There remain many well-known vestiges of ancient rules of law
which treat women as inferiors. In many States, a woman cannot
handle or own separate property in the same manner as her husband.
In some- States, she cannot engage in business or pursue a profession
or occupation as freely as can a member of the male sex. Women are
classified separately for purposes of jury service in many States.
States do not vest in the wife the same degree
Community-property
of property rights as her husband enjoys. The inheritance rights of
widows differ from those of widowers in some States. Restrictive work
laws, which purport to protect women by denying them a man's
freedom to pursue employment, actually result n discrimination in
the employment of women by making it so burdensome upon employers. Such protective restrictions hinder women in their competition
with men for supervisory, technical, and professional job opportunities.
The subcommittee has considered carefully the amendment which
was added to this proposal on the floor of the Senate in the 81st, 83d,
and 86th Congresses. Its effect was to preserve "rights, benefits, or
exemptions" conferred by law upon persons of the female sex. This
qualification is not acceptable to women who want equal rights under
the law. It is under the guise of so-called "rights" or "benefits" that
women have been treated unequally and denied opportunities which
are available to men.
Just as equal protection of the law under the 14th amendment is
not a mathematical equality, this amendment does not contemplate
that women must be treated in all respects the same as men. Nor
does it mean that all legal differentiation of the sexes will be abolished.
Equality does not mean sameness. Equal rights does not necessarily
mean identical-rights. For instance, a law granting maternity benefits to women would not be an unlawful discrimination against men.
As a grant to mothers, it would be based on a reasonable classification
despite its limitation to members of one sex.
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Nor would the amendment mean that criminal laws governing sexual
offenses would become unconstitutional. The public has such an interest in relations between the sexes that the conduct of both sexes is
subject to regulation under the police power apart from any considerations of unequal treatment or protective status.
In the past, it has been suggested that this amendment would require
treatment of men and women for purposes of compulsory miliequalservice.
that all men are treated
tary for This isof no more true than
in physical abilities
Differences
duty.
equally all purposeswouldmilitary
be
to
a
material
factor. It could
continue
among persons
be expected that women will be equally subject to military conscription and they have demonstrated that they can perform admirably in
capacities in the Armed Forces. But the Government would
many
not require that women serve where they are not fitted just as men
with physical defects are utilized in special capacities, if at all.
The subcommittee wishes to emphasize one additional fact. The
amendment would confirm equal rights under law for both
proposed
men and women. In instances where laws are burdensome to men
because of their sex, they would benefit from the amendment.
solely
For instance, alimony laws probably could not favor women solely
because of their sex. However, a divorce decree could award support
to a mother if she was granted custody of children. This would
be incidental to the children's support. Matters concerning custody
support of children properly should be determined solely with
and.
a view to the welfare of the children, without favoritism to either
solely because of sex.
parent
Both major political parties have repeatedly supported this proin their national party platforms.
posal
The subcommittee has been in continuous study of the equal rights
amendments. Correspondence and interviews with the nationally
known experts and exemplary organizations in this field have been
conducted throughout the session. All the preparatory work has
been done, and it is anticipated that the subcommittee will report out
favorably this resolution in the 2d session of the 88th Congress.

18-YEAR-OLD VOTING
Two proposals pending in the Subcommittee on Constitutional
Amendments would lower the voting age to 18. They are Senate
Joint Resolution 2 (by Mr. Randolph) and Senate Joint Resolution 38
(by Messrs. Keating and Kefauver).that the
Each resolution provides simply
voting rights of citizens
of
or
of the United States who are 18 years age older shall not be denied
or abridged on account of age by the United States or by any State.
would apply to all State and Federal elections.
Thus,
they
resolutions
were included in the hearings conducted by the
Similar
subcommittee during the 1st session of the 87th Congress.
STATEMENT

There is a difference of opinion on this question of lowering the
constitutional amendment both as to substance and form.
age
voting
by
Some support the objective of lowering the voting age to 18, believing that young people are as well qualified to vote at 18 as at 21.

CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS

29

Some believe the question should be left with each individual State
to accomplish this result through local action rather than imposing it
on the entire Nation by amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
Some feel that the age should remain at 21.
Some feel that the rising level of education in our country justified
uniform extension of the franchise to 18-year-olds.
The executive favors lowering the age to 18 which was evidenced
by the late President's support for 18-year-old voting for the District
of Columbia. The executive, however, took the position that the
matter should be left for separate determination by each State.
The last time the Senate considered 18-year-old voting was in the
83d Congress, when a proposed constitutional amendment was
approved by a vote of 34 to 24, five votes short of the required

two-thirds majority.
A test of current Senate sentiment may have occurred on September 19, 1961, when the. Senate voted on the Presidential Elections
Code for the District of Columbia. The bill reported from the
District of Columbia Committee had set the voting age at 18. An
amendment establishing the voting age at 21 was agreed to by a vote
of 38 to 36.
The subcommittee decided not to act on the voting age resolutions
and instead decided to continue its staff studies. It is apparent that
there is no unanimity of agreement on this problem, nor at the
present time is there an unusual amount of interest throughout the
country.
REPEAL OF 22D AMENDMENT
Senate Joint Resolution 26, which was introduced by Messrs.
Kcfauver and Long of Missouri, proposes that the 22d amendment to
the Constitution be repealed. This would remove the two-term
limitation upon the President.
STATEMENT

In the 87th Congress the subcommittee considered a similar resolution (S.J. Res. 15) on August 3, 1961. The opinion was expressed
that there was not sufficient public interest to justify action at that
time. There is a definite feeling among most members of the subcommittee that more experience should be gained with the operation
of the 22d amendment before its repeal is considered. In the 87th
Congress the subcommittee voted to recommend to the full Committee
on the Judiciary that this resolution (i.e., S.J. Res. 15 of the 87th
be postponed indefinitely. The subcommittee's recommendaCong.)
tion was adopted by the full committee on January 31, 1962.
The subcommittee decided not to take action on Senate Joint
Resolution 26 preferring to hold it in the committee pending additional
studies and correspondence with known constitutional authorities.
staff digest the
Rather, it is contemplated that the subcommittee
voluminous materials and make a subcommittee report for
existing
the future use of the committee and the Senate.

INDIVIDUAL VIEWS OF MR. KEATING
I concur in the report but with this one additional observation.
As one who for many years had been deeply concerned with the
of Presidential inability, I had thought that at last we were
problem
well on our way toward a workable and acceptable solution when on
June 25, 1963, this subcommittee unanimously reported favorably
to the full committee a proposed amendment (S.J. Res. 35) sponsored
the late Senator Kefauver, Senator Dodd, and myself. At the
by
time of this writing, Senate Joint Resolution 35 is on the agenda of
the full committee and ripe for action.
It is an unquestionable fact that the assassination of President
John F. Kennedy cn November 22, 1963, generated both in and out
of Congress renev ed concern over Presidential inability. But the
events of that tragic day in American history certainly cannot be
said to have added any new dimensions to the underlying constitutional
which had not already been fully considered. For over 175
problembefore
President Kennedy was assassinated, and in the few
years
months since, the original constitutional silences on Presidential
silences that spell a grave potential danger to the
inability-the
and
continuity of the American Presidency as an institutionstability
have remained absolutely the same. President Kennedy's death,
therefore, did not give rise to the problem but only underlined its
importance.
long-recognized
This elementary fact is stressed as but a caveat. The legal spadework has been done. A consensus has been reached-as of June of
last year, in fact. I very much regret that, rather than galvanizing
the Congress into completing action on Senate Joint Resolution 35,
President Kennedy's assassination apparently has triggered a surfeit
of proposals on inability which can only serve the purpose of further
and of trafficking with the danger of losing our past consensus
delay
without replacing it with one that is demonstrably superior.
It is ever so much more important, in my judgment, to take action
in the field of inability than in respect to changing the line of Presidential succession or otherwise dealing with a vacancy in the Vice
For the succession problem at least has been provided
Presidency.
for in the act of 1947, and although it is not in my view the best
solution that can be-devised, it is nevertheless unrealistic to suppose
that a change can be worked in the present session of the Congress.
The inability enigma, however, demands immediate attention, and
I think it would be most unfortunate if the further hearings on the
are now in progress were to result in either protracted
subjectorwhich
in
delay
dissipating the widespread agreement on Senate Joint
Resolution 35 that had previously been reached.
KENNETH B. KEATING.
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Proposed constitutional amendments introduced in Senate during Ist sess., 88th Cong.
[Tabulated by number and chronologically]
Resolution No.

SJ. Res. 1----------------S.J. Res. 2---------SJ. Res. 8------------S.J. Res. 12
---------------

Sponsors

Subject matter

Mrs. Smith.-----.-------Mr. Randolph.----------------------Mr. McGee.------------------------Messrs. Mundt, Thurmond, McClellan, Hruska,
Morton, Fong, Boggs, Stennis, Prouty, and Gold-

Election of President and Vice President.------18-year-old voting
Election of President and Vice President.---------do --.------------------.-------

Date
introduced

--------------

Hearings Reported
conby subducted

Jan. 14,1963 X-----do.------do-----do.--- X---

X.

water.

XMr. Smathers--..--.------------- ---.do----------------------do---Jan. 15, 1963
Messrs. Talmadge, Byrd of Virginia, Robertson, State control of public
schools----- -------Eastland, Stennis,
Johnston, Hill, Sparkman, and
Simpson.
Ellender, Long of Louisiana,
Jan. 23,1963 X--Election of President and Vice President------.J. Res. 24 --------------- Mr. Kefauver
Presidential and vice-presidential primary electionsS.J. Res. 25-----------do ---------------------------------------- -do..
-do..
Messrs. Kefauver and Long of Missouri--.----SJ. Res. 2----------Repeal of 22d amendment --------------X
-do..
Election of President and Vice President-.-.-----.Mr. Kefauver-----SJ. Res. 27.----------------X
S.J. Res. 28---------- -do.....
---------------------Presidential inability.-----------------..---- ----.do ----- x------:
SJ. Res. 29.--------------- Messrs. Curtis and Byrd of Virginia-------.---- Balancing of budget_-----.--- ---do----- X-___
Feb. 5, 1963
Messrs. Kefauver and Keating------------------- Presidential inability-.S.J. Res. 35----......
o.
SJ. Res. 36-----------do
--.
Emergency appointment of Representatives
do.---,
S.3. Res. 37.---------.--------do .-----------------..--..------- Residence requirements for voting.------------- .....do--..
---do
----------------------SJ. Res. 38-----------.18-year-old voting.--------------------- ---do
See footnotes at end of table, p. 32.
SJ. Res. 13--------------SJ. Res. 16----------------

committee

------

--

----------------------

---------------

.......

-------

X------i

---------------
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Mr. Tower......-----------------------------SJ. Res. 54
------- -----Mr.
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-
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[S. Res. 57, 88th Cong., 1st sess.]
RESOLUTION

Resolved, That the Committee on the Judiciary, or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof, is authorized under sections 134 (a)
and 136 of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, as amended,
and in accordance with its jurisdictions specified by rule XXV of the
Standing Rules of the Senate, to examine, investigate, and make a
complete
study of any and all matters pertaining to constitutional
amendments.
SEC. 2. For the purposes of this resolution the committee, from
March 1, 1963, to January 31, 1964, inclusive, is authorized (1) to
make such expenditures as it deems advisable; (2) to employ upon a
basis, technical, clerical, and other assistants and consultemporary
tants: Provided, That the minority is authorized to select one person
for appointment, and the person so selected shall be appointed and his
compensation shall be so fixed that his gross rate shall not be less by
more than $1,600 than the highest gross rate paid to any other emand (3) with the prior consent of the heads of the departments
ployee;
or agencies concerned, and the Committee on Rules and Administration, to utilize the reimbursable services, information, facilities, and
personnel ofTheany of the departments or agencies of the Government.
committee shall report its activities and findings,
SEC. 3.
together with its recommendations for legislation as it deems advisable,
to the Senate at the earliest practicable date, but not later than
31, 1964.
January
SEC. 4. Expenses of the-committee, under this resolution, which
shall not exceed $54,423, shall be paid from the contingent fund of the
Senate upon vouchers approved by the chairman of the committee.
[Confidential Committee Print No. 2, July 13, 1963]
[S.J. Res. 35, 88th Cong., 1st sess.]
JOINT RESOLUTION Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the
United States relating to cases where the President is unable to discharge
the powers and duties of his office

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled (two-thirds of each House
concurring therein), That the following article is proposed as an
amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which shall be
valid to all intents and purposes as part of the Constitution only if
ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States within
seven years from the date of its submission by the Congress:
"ARTICLE "In case of the removal of the President from office or of his death
or resignation, the said office shall devolve on the Vice President. In
case of the inability of the President to discharge the powers and
duties of the said office, the said powers and duties shall devolve on
the Vice President as Acting President
until the inability be removed.
The Congress may by law provide for the case of removal, death,
resignation or inability, both of the President and Vice President,

34

CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS

what officer shall then be President, or in case of inability, act
declaring
as President, and such officer shall be or act as President accordingly,
until a President shall be elected or, in case of inability, until the
shall be earlier removed. Te-e eomffmneemet*
nt t4temiainability
4 ty
by s+e e o.ire
i n ed
ttw
ftab4i-y htll bee deef
reft
. as .
saftl bythe commencement
pr ovide.." Congress may prescribe by law the method by
and termination of any inability shall be
which
determined."
[S.J.

lies.

36, 88th Cong.,

1st

sess.]

JOINT RESOLUTION To amend the Constitution to authorize Governors to fill
temporary vacancies in the House of Representatives

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled (two-thirds of each House
concurring
therein), That the following article is proposed as an
amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and shall be
valid to all intents and purposes as part of the Constitution only if
ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States
within seven years from the date of its submission by the Congress:
"ARTICLE -,
"SECTION 1. On any date that the total number of vacancies in the
House of Representatives exceeds one-third of the authorized memberand for a period of sixty days thereafter, the executive
ship thereof,
of each State shall have power to make temporary appointauthority
ments to fill any vacancies, including those happening during such
in the representation from his State in the House of Repreperiod,
sentatives. Any person temporarily appointed to fill any such vaserve until the people fill the vacancy by election as
cancy shall
provided for by article I, section 2, of the Constitution.
"SEC. 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by

appropriate legislation."

[S.J. Res. 37, 88th Cong., 1st sess.]
JOINT RESOLUTION Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the
United States relative to residence requirements for voting in presidential
elections

Resolved by the Senate and Htouse of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled (two-thirds of each House conThat the following article is hereby proposed as an
curring' therein),
anlenl enollt to the Constitution of the United States, which shall be
valid to all intents and purposes as part of the Constitution if ratified
of three-fourths of the several States within seven
by theofleFislatures
the
date
of
its submission by the Congress:
years
"ARTICLE
"SECTION 1. NoTcitizen of the United States who is otherwise qualified to vote in ally election held in any State or in the District constituting the seat of Government of the United States for the purpose,
in whole or in part, of choosing electors of President and Vice President
-
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shall be denied the right to vote for such electors in such election
because of any residence requirement of such State or such District,
as the case may be, if such citizen has resided in such State (or the
thereof with respect to which the requirement
political subdivision
as the case may be, for a period of at
applies), or in such District,such
election.
least ninety days preceding
"SEC. 2. Any citizen of the United States who has been a resident
of a State, or any political subdivision thereof, or the District constituting the seat of the Government of the United States for a lesser
period than that required for voting in an. election for electors of
President and Vice President, and who is otherwise qualified to vote
in such election, shall nevertheless be entitled to vote in such election,
if lie was either eligible to so vote in another political subdivision of
the same State, or in another State, or in such District, immediately
prior to his change of residence, or if he would have been eligible to
so vote if lie had continued to reside in such place until such election."
[S.J. Res. 12, 88th Cong., 1st sess.]
JOINT RESOLUTION Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the
United States providing for the election of the President and Vice President
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled (two-thirds of each House concurring therein), That the following article is proposed as an amendment
to the Constitution of the United States which shall be valid to all
intents and purposes as part of the Constitution if ratified by the
legislatures of three-fourths of the several States within seven years
from the date of its submission by the Congress:

"ARTICLE"SECTION 1. Each State shall choose a number of electors of President and Vice President equal to the whole number of Senators and
Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress;
but no Senator or Representative, or person holding an office of trust
or profit under the United States, shall be chosen an elector.
"The electors to which a State is entitled by virtue of its Senators
shall be elected by the people thereof, and the electors to which it is
entitled by virtue of its Representatives shall be elected by the people
within single-elector districts established by the legislature thereof;
such districts to be composed of compact and contiguous territory,
containing as nearly as practicable the number of persons which
entitled the State to one Representative in the Congress; and such
districts when formed shall not be altered until another census has
been taken. Before being chosen elector, each candidate for the
office shall officially declare the persons for whom he will vote for
President and Vice President, which declaration shall be binding on
successor. In choosing electors of President and Vice President
any
the voters in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for
electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislature, except
that the legislature of any State may prescribe lesser qualifications
with respect to residence therein.
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"The electors shall meet in their respective States, fill any vacancies
in their number as directed by the State legislature, and vote by
ballot for President and Vice President, one of whom, at least,
signed
shall not be an inhabitant of the same State with themselves; they
shall name in their ballots the person voted for as President, and in
distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice President; and they shall
make distinct lists of all persons voted for as President, and of all
persons voted for as Vice President, and of the number of votes for
each,
excluding therefrom any votes for persons other than those
named by an elector before he was chosen, unless one or both of the
persons so named be deceased, which lists they shall sign and certify,
and transmit sealed to the seat of government of the United States,
directed to the President of the Senate; the President of the Senate
the presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives,
shall, allin the
certificates and the votes shall then be counted; the person
open
of votes for President shall be the Presihavingif the
greatest number
such number be a majority of the whole number of electors
dent, and
the person having the greatest number of votes for Vice
chosen;
President shall be the Vice President, if such a number be a majority
of the whole number of electors chosen.
"If no person voted for as President has a majority of the whole
number of electors, then from the persons having the three highest
numbers on the lists of persons voted for as President, the Senate and
the House of Representatives, assembled and voting as individual
Members of one body, shall choose immediately, -by ballot, the
President; a quorum for such purpose shall be three-fourths of the
whole number of the Senators and Representatives, and a majority
of the whole number shall be necessary to a choice; if additional
ballots be necessary, the choice on the fifth ballot shall be between
the two persons having the highest number of votes on the fourth
ballot.
"If no person-voted for as Vice President has a majority of the whole
number of electors, then the Vice President shall be chosen from the
numbers on the lists of persons
persons having the three highest
voted for as Vice President in the same manner as herein provided
for choosing the President. But no person constitutionally ineligible
to the office of President shall be eligible to that of Vice President of
the United States.
"SEc. 2. The Congress may by law provide for the case of the
death of any of the persons from whom the Senate and the House of
Representatives
may choose a President or a Vice President whenever
the right of choice shall have devolved upon them.
"SEC. 3. This article supersedes the second and fourth paragraphs
of section 1, article II, of the Constitution, the twelfth article of
amendment to the Constitution and section 4 of the twentieth article
of amendment to the Constitution. Except as herein expressly prothis article does not supersede the twenty-third article of
vided,
amendment.
"SEC. 4. Electors
pursuant to the twenty-third-article of
Constitution shall be elected by the people of
amendment to this appointed
such district in such manner as the Congress may direct. Before
chosen as such elector, each candidate shall officially declare
being
the persons for whom he will vote for President and Vice President,
which declaration shall be binding on any successor. Such electors
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shall meet in the district and perform the duties provided in section
1 of this article.
"SEC. 5. This article shall take effect on the 1st day of July following
its ratification."
[S.J. Res. 27, 88th Cong., 1st sess.]
JOINT RESOLUTION Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the
United States providing for the election of President and Vice President
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled (two-thirds of each House concurring therein), That an amendment is hereby proposed to the
Constitution of the United States, which shall be valid to all intents
and purposes as part of the Constitution only if ratified by threefourths of the legislatures of the several States within seven years
from the date of its submission by the-Congress:

"ARTICLE "SECTION 1. The Executive power shall be vested in a President
of the United States of America. He shall hold his office during the
term of four years, and, together with the Vice President, chosen for
the same term, be elected as provided in this Constitution.
"The office of elector of the President and Vice President, as established by section 1 of article II and the twelfth article of amendment
to this Constitution, is hereby abolished. The President and Vice
President shall be elected by the people of the several States and the
District constituting the seat of government of the United States.
The electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for
electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislature except
that the legislature of any State may prescribe: lesser qualifications
with respect to residence therein. The electors in the District shall
have such qualifications as the Congress may prescribe. The places
and manner of holding such election in each State shall be prescribed
the legislature thereof. The place and manner of holding such
by
election in the District shall be prescribed by the Congress. Congress
shall determine the time of such election, which shall be the same
United States. Until otherwise determined by the
throughout the election
shall be held on the Tuesday next after the
such
Congress,
first Monday in November of the year preceding the year in which
the regular term of the President is to begin. Each State shall be
entitled to a number of electoral votes equal to the whole number of
Senators and Representatives to which such State may be entitled in
the Congress. The District shall be entitled to a number of electoral
votes equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives in
to which the District would be entitled if it were a State,
Congress
but
in no event more than the least populous State.
"Within forty-five days after such election, or at such time as
shall direct, the official custodian of the election returns of
Congress
each-State and the District shall make distinct lists of all persons for
whom votes were cast for President and the number of votes for each
and the total vote of the electors of the State or the District for all
persons for President, which lists he shall sign and certify and transmit
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sealed to the seat of the Government of the United States, directed to
the President of the Senate. On the 6th day of January following the
election, unless the Congress
by law appoints a different day not
earlier than the 4th day of January and not later than the 10th day of
the President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the
January,
Senate and House of Representatives, open all certificates and the
votes shall than be counted. Each person for whom votes were cast
for President in each State and the District shall be credited with such
of the electoral votes thereof as he received of the total
proportion
vote of the electors therein for President. In making the computation,
fractional numbers less than one one-thousandth shall be disregarded.
The person having the greatest number of electoral votes for President
shall be President, if such number be at least 40 per centum of the
whole number of such electoral votes. If no person has at least 40 per
centum of the whole number of electoral votes, then from the persons
having the two highest numbers of electoral votes for President the
Senate and the House of Representatives sitting in joint session shall
choose immediately, by ballot, the President. A majority of the votes
of the combined authorized membership of the Senate and the House
of Representatives shall be necessary for a choice.
"The Vice President shall be likewise elected, at the same time and
in the same manner and subject to the same provisions, as the President, but no person constitutionally ineligible for the office of President
shall be eligible to that of Vice President of the United States.
"The Congress may by law provide for the case of the death of any
of the persons from whom the Senate and the House of Representatives
whenever the right of choice shall be have
may choose a President
for the case of death of any of the persons
and
devolved upon them,
from whom the Senate and the House of Representatives may choose
a Vice President whenever the right of choice shall have devolved
them.
upon
"SEC. 2. This article shall take effect on the 10th day of February
next after one year shall have elapsed following its ratification."
[S.J. Res. 45, 88th Cong., 1st sess.]
JOINT RESOLUTION Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the
United States relative to equal rights for men and women

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States oj America in Congress assembled (two-thirds of each Houce
concurring therein), That the following article is proposed as an
amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which shall be
valid to all intents and purposes as part of the Constitution when
ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States:
"ARTICLE "SECTION 1. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied
or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.
Congress and the several States shall have power, within their respective jurisdictions, to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
"SEC. 2. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been
ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of
three-fourths of the several States.
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"SEC. 3. This amendment shall take effect one

of ratification."
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year after the date

[S. J. Res. 2, 88th Cong., 1st sess.]
JOINT RESOLUTION Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the
United States, extending the right to vote to citizens eighteen years of age or
older

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
of America in Congress assembled (two-thirds of each House
concurring therein), That the following article is hereby proposed as an
amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which shall be
valid to all intents and purposes as part of the Constitution when
ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States:
"ARTICLE "SETrIoN 1. The right of citizens of the United States, who are
eighteen
years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged
by the United States or by any State on account of age. The Congress
shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
"SEC. 2. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been
ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of
three-fourths of the several States within seven years from the date of
its submission to the States by the Congress."
States

[S.J. Res. 38, 88th Cong., 1st seas.]
JOINT RESOLUTION Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the
United States granting to citizens of the United States who have attained the
age of eighteen the right to vote.
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled (two-thirds of each House
concurring
therein), That the following article is hereby proposed as
an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which shall
be valid to all intents and purposes as part of the Constitution only
if ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States
within seven years from the date of its submission by the Congress:

"ARTICLE "The right of citizens of the United States, who have reached the
age of eighteen years, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or by any State on account of age. The Congress shall
have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
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[S.J. Res. 26, 88th Cong., 1st sess.]
JOINT RESOLUTION Proposing an amendment to the Constitution to repeal
the twenty-second article of amendment to the Constitution

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled (two-thirds of each House concurring
therein), That the following article is proposed as an amendment
to the Constitution of the United States, which shall be valid as part
of the Constitution only if ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths
of the several States within seven years from the date of its submission
by the Congress:
"ARTICLE"SECTION 1. The twenty-second article of amendment to the Constitution of the United States is hereby repealed.
"SEC. 2. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been
ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of
three-fourths of the States within seven years from the date of its
submission to the States by the Congress."
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